Prompt Injection Red-Team Review with Claude Code: MCP Tool Boundary
A production playbook for prompt injection red-team review in cross-industry operations using Claude Code: mcp tool boundary, run-scoped inputs, logs, typed results, and artifacts.
Audience: AI security teams
The problem
AI security teams need prompt injection red-team review to run repeatedly against prompts, tool policies, transcripts, and suspicious inputs. In cross-industry operations, the pain is not one good answer; it is repeatability, auditability, exception handling, and evidence that survives handoff.
Implementation path
Expose only the MCP tools needed for prompt injection red-team review, validate tool arguments, keep credentials in the owning service, and log each call outside the sandbox.
Tradeoffs and failure modes
Narrow tool boundaries reduce agent flexibility, but make the integration reviewable and supportable. For prompt injection red-team review, the practical test is whether a second run can be debugged, retried, and consumed by a product without reading the raw agent transcript.
Tool policy
tool: red-team-prompt-review_lookup
agent: Claude Code
input_scope: /skill/.argo/inputs
credential_owner: broker
log_arguments: true
network_policy: allowlisted
Run this on Argo